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Objectivity is a buzz word in philosophy of science: it permeates various metaphysical
and epistemological discussions, and it helps to build public trust in science. The
epistemic authority of science seems to depend on the degree to which science is
objective. Conversely, “just subjective” or “not objectively verified” are labels that are
often used by science skeptics and deniers to dismiss the scientific state of the art in
a discipline (e.g., climate science). Understanding scientific objectivity is crucial for
making sense of the debate about the reliability of scientific research.
Central philosophical questions about objectivity in science are: What makes a
scientific claimobjective?Can the ideal of objectivity be attained at all? Shouldweeven
strive for it? And so on. Today, most philosophers see objectivity as a multi-faceted
concept that can apply to scientific entities (theories, functions, measurements) as well
as to individual reasoning processes and the social aspects of knowledge production.
All these questions were discussed at the 8th Munich–Sydney–Tilburg (MuST)
conference inTilburg, 10–12 June 2015. The papers in this special issuewere presented
at the conference and selected for publication through a standard double-blind peer-
review process. They approach the topic of scientific objectivity from various angles:
the relation to pluralism and relativism, natural laws, epistemic communities, and
problems of the special sciences.
Max Bialek defends David Lewis’ best system analysis of natural laws against the
objection that it cannotmake sense of the intuition that natural laws are objective. After
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all, what counts as “best” depends on how a scientist measures and trades off criteria
such as simplicity and goodness-of-fit. There may be more than one set of natural
laws. Bialek shows that one need not adopt extreme positions about the relativity of
the best system analysis in order to answer this criticism.
Jaana Elgi discusses how philosophical proposals about the social organization
of science should reflect the increasing democratization of science. She studies the
professional ethics of American archaelogy as an example where politically motivated
and epistemically motivated changes converge in practice.
Inkeri Koskinen investigates how social accounts of objectivity need to be changed
in the light of the democratization of scientific inquiry, in particular in situations
where one cannot readily identify the relevant epistemic community. She combines
her critique of prevalent accounts of objectivity with a case study where indigenous
communities are involved in the process of knowledge production.
Martin Kusch discusses the philosophical implications of a particular form of
epistemic relativism: namely the idea that it is impossible to show in a non-question-
begging way that one epistemic system is superior to (all) others. Particular attention
is paid to the “Problem of the Criterion”: the view that the attempt to justify particular
standards as objective runs into a regress problem.
David Ludwig conducts a case study about local knowledge in indigenous commu-
nities, using it as a means of evaluating the current debate about scientific objectivity.
He concludes, contrary to common wisdom, that local knowledge (as opposed to
universal knowledge) can often qualify as objective.
Femke Truijens tackles the view that differences between pre- and post-treatment
symptom levels in medicine offer a procedurally objective quantification of treatment
efficacy. She uses psychotherapy as a case to argue that this method operates on a
problematic numerical basis, due to the difficulties to measure symptom levels in an
objective way.
Finally, Marcel Weber engages with Searle’s thesis that biological functions cannot
be objective, due to their dependency on the goals that we value (e.g., life and survival).
Against Searle, Weber argues that functions do not ontologically depend on values
and that function statements are made true by supposedly objective features such as
causal dependence, part-whole relations, or mechanistic constitution.
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